

Significant Performance Incident Review

Axle Counter Failure
Swan on the line
(29/06/23)






Attendees

[illegible]

5 Jointly Agreed Objectives

1. Safely move all passengers to their desired destination on time



2. Jointly put passengers at the heart of our decision making



3. Provide reliable and timely passenger information for a seamless journey



4. Enable the right people to make the right decisions



5. Embed a continuous improvement culture






Points for Discussion

- Service management
 - Contingency Plans
 - Consecutive failures
 - Service gaps
 - Management of driver resources
- Communication
 - Conferences
 - Messaging
 - Passenger Information During Disruption
- Customer Feedback
 - Customer Messaging
 - Service level vs Contingency Plan
 - Key Customer Complaints
 - Communication to station staff
- Open Discussion



Incident Headlines & Performance Impact

Incident	PPM Failures	Total Delay Minutes
Axle Counter Failure	446	1588
Swan on the line	632	3034



Incident Summary, Swan on the line (Compass 110233)

- **Incident start time: 12:20**
- **Incident end time (good service declared on all lines): 19:31**
- 12:20 call received in the RCC via the LS AR emergency line that there is a swan on the line at WBP
- Caution imposed and at 12:24 the driver of 9R76 reported that the swan is in front of their train on the WB line.
- Station hold put in place trapping 3 trains between stations
- Diversions to Paddington/Liverpool St HL commence at 12:30
- Caution in place on the EB line at 12:32
- 12:35 NR MOM requested to attend site (Hayes Inner)
- 12:39 COS10 implemented
- Line blockage taken at 12:57 (by RfLI IRM)
- 13:20 IRM unable to capture swan and therefore request made to SIM for line block to be lifted in order to move 9R76 into a station as has been stranded for some time.
- 13:34 9R76 OTM after swan now moved to TB C
- 13:41 unable to move any further due to swan now being back in front of the train. Decision made to have driver change ends and reverse train back into PDX as it is now clear of the points
- 13:45 request made to GWR for their services to stop additionally at MTR stations due to lack of service from us
- 14:03 9R76 reported as setting back into PDX
- 14:31 MOM on site to assist IRM and line block back in place for second attempt to catch swan
- 14:47 Swan has now moved onto NR mainlines
- 15:04 swan struck by GWR service
- 15:20 block lifted
- 15:30 contingency plan removed and service recovery commenced
- Good service declared at 19:31 on all lines

What Went Well (taken from the Control Post Incident Review)

What went well (Best Practice):

- SSDO requested MOM to attend via Western MOM
- Recovery of operations was well controlled and brought the service together in a consistent and time based manner – setting targets for trains and stepping

Lessons Learnt (taken from the Control Post Incident Review)

What could be improved: (Comms, Time to site, Plan, initial Response Service Recovery etc)

- Question asked by SSDO whether ERU was required – should have been called regardless.
- First IRM to site confirmed they had not had relevant training.
- Network Rail MOM was at the access point for a while before being able to access line as decision made by RFLI for them to wait until relieving IRM arrived.
- Relieving IRM had handheld terminal issue – second HHT issue of the day.
- Length of time to both put on and take off line blockages in COS seems very long.
- Only one SDRM on shift for early turn.
- Time of incident meant that units being diverted were driven by drivers at end of their diagrams. On West, if all trains had terminated at EAL then units could have been worked into Old Oak depot instead of being left at Paddington HL. Drivers at ABX and PLU unable to pass through COS
- More West trains to terminate at EAL then ECS into Old Oak